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ON FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE: 
A REPLY TO TWO CRITICS 
Ted A. Warfield 
William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argu-
ment for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I 
reply to their commentaries. 
1. 
In "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible" I 
argued, as the title indicates, that divine foreknowledge and human free-
dom are compatible.] Both William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have 
commented on my article.2 I offer the following in reply. 
II. Reply to Professor Hasker. 
One way to argu~ that two propositions are consistent is to argue that 
both are true. An argument of this form for the conclusion that divine 
essential omniscience and human freedom are compatible might look like 
this.: 
Argument One 
PI. God exists and is essentially omniscient. 
P2. Human beings are free agents. 
CI. So, Divine omniscience and human freedom are compatible. 
A second way to argue that two propositions are consistent is by arguing 
that one is necessary and the other possible. An argument along these 
lines for the same conclusion about God and freedom might look like this. 
Argument Two 
PI. It is necessary that God exists and is essentially omniscient. 
P2. It is possible that human beings are free agents. 
CI. So, Divine omniscience and human freedom are compatible. 
Readers of William Hasker's "No Easy Way Out: A Response to 
Warfield" might think that I have somewhere defended one or both of 
these arguments. Referring to my earlier article, Hasker claims (p. 362) that 
arguments like Arguments One and Two are simplifications of my argu-
ment, doing "everything Warfield's original argument does, with some-
what greater economy".3 
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Having confused my argument with arguments like Arguments One 
and Two, Hasker goes on to point out that what I said in defense of my 
argument does not provide anything like adequate support for the premis-
es of Arguments One and Two.4 Hasker is correct that I did not provide 
adequate support for the premises of these arguments, but I was not 
attempting to do so. I was attempting to provide support only for the 
premises of my argument. 
Here is another look at my argument. Just about everyone, including 
Hasker and other critics of theological compatibilism, accepts that human 
freedom is consistent with the existence of true future tensed propositions 
expressing human actions.5 So, it is a point of agreement between Hasker 
and theological compatibilists that, for example, the following two propo-
sitions are consistent: 
(2) Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
(3) It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD.6 
Consider now the following proposition: 
(1) God exists in all possible worlds and is omniscient in all possi-
bleworlds. 
If (1) is true, then (3) is strictly equivalent to 
(5) God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD. 
It follows that if (1) is true, (5) is consistent with (2). This means that there 
is a (common) view of God and omniscience, a view partially expressed by 
(1), on which divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. 
Nothing Hasker says has shaken my confidence in the soundness of this 
simple argument, for nothing that Hasker says addresses this simple argu-
ment. Hasker says 
it is clear that Warfield assumes (1) to be true. (Otherwise he couldn't 
show the equivalence of (3) and (5) .... He also assumes (2) is logically 
possible; otherwise it couldn't be consistent with (3). (p. 362). 
This is what leads Hasker to reformulate my argument as Argument Two, 
but this is a mistake. 
I don't in any inappropriate way "assume" that (2) is logically possible. 
That (2) is possible is a strict consequence of something Hasker and I both 
accept, namely that (2) and (3) are compatible. I assume that there is noth-
ing dialectically inappropriate in accepting a proposition implied by a 
claim of my opponent. More to the heart of Hasker's criticism, the only 
sense in which I assume (1) to be true is in assuming it for conditional 
proof. I assume, for conditional proof, that (1) is true and show that the 
consistency of (3) and (5) follows. It follows that one view of God and 
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omniscience is consistent with the existence of human freedom. 7 
I can do, and did, all of this without arguing for the truth of (1). I do this 
in just the way that one might argue that causal determinism is incompati-
ble with human freedom by assuming the truth of determinism and deriv-
ing a "no freedom" conclusion. One can do this, and thereby conclude that 
causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible, without 
defending the thesis that the actual world is deterministic. Similarly, I 
maintain, one can argue that the truth of a certain view of God and omni-
science is compatible with the thesis that humans are free agents without 
arguing that the actual world contains both God and human freedom. I 
therefore reject Hasker's alleged simplification of my argument and claim 
that Hasker's criticisms are not criticisms of my argument. 
III. Reply to Professor Brueckner 
I fully accept the main point of Brueckner's commentary on my paper. I 
fail to understand, however, why Brueckner thinks that his main point is a 
criticism of my paper. The main point is that one can reject an argument as 
unpersuasive without accepting that the premises of the argument are 
broadly logically compatible with the negation of the argument's conclu-
sion (p. 132). I of course agree that this is true. Brueckner claims that my 
argument somehow depends on a rejection of this triviality l do not agree. 
Brueckner maintains that my "strategy is to claim that in order to reject 
[arguments for logical fatalism], one must hold that there is a possible 
world in which [(2) and (3)] are both true" (p. 133). "But," he continues, 
"that will be a world in which [given the assumption of (1)] God exists and 
foreknows every human action, including Plantinga's 2000 AD ascent" (p. 
133). "And so," he concludes, "it will be a world in which ... Plantinga 
freely climbs" (p. 133). The world in question, then, would be a world with 
both freedom and foreknowledge and so freedom and foreknowledge are, 
if the argument is correct, compatible. 
Brueckner criticizes the initial assumption of this argument, pointing 
out that the trivial truth noted above conflicts with the claim that rejecting 
arguments for fatalism requires that one accept that there is a possible 
world in which both (2) and (3) are true. What Brueckner fails to provide, 
however, is any evidence to support his claim that my "strategy" is what 
he says it is.8 
I did not in any way endorse the "strategy" that Brueckner attributes to 
me. What I did say in presenting my argument is this: "I assume that fatal-
ism is false and not merely that the arguments for it are unpersuasive" (p. 
84, note 3). I take logical fatalism to be the doctrine that true future tensed 
propositions about human action are incompatible with the free perfor-
mance of these actions. The falsity of this position, then, implies that free 
action is compatible with true future tensed propositions describing the 
actions (and does not merely imply that certain arguments for the fatalist 
position are unpersuasive). 
Is it in any way dialectically inappropriate to assume the falsity of logi-
cal fatalism in providing my argument for theological compatibilism? I 
don't think it is. After all, as noted both in my earlier article and again in 
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reply to Professor Hasker, I know of no participant in the foreknowledge 
debate (compatibilist or incompatibilist) who does not accept the falsity of 
logical fatalism. Relevant interlocutors therefore have no room to disagree 
with this assumption. 
My argument for theological compatibilism is not addressed to philoso-
phers who do not think that logical fatalism is false. A philosopher who 
takes a more cautious agnostic position on logical fatalism will not be 
moved by my argument towards the theological compatibilist position.9 
No theological incompatibilist I am aware of, however, is agnostic about 
the truth value of a proposition asserting the logical fatalist position. 
Brueckner has, J conclude, criticized a claim that is in no way a part of 
my argument for theological compatibilism. As a consequence I find noth-
ing to disagree with in his commentary except his claim that he has shown 
there to be a problem with my argument.10 
IV. Conclusion 
I conclude that the commentaries of Professors Hasker and Brueckner fail to 
make solid contact with the argument of my original paper. I do not main-
tain that my argument is immune from criticism. One might, for example, 
wish to take up the issues about the use of conditional proof in this modally 
charged context (as mentioned in note 7). And one might, of course, chal-
lenge the argument in some other way.l1 The challenges from Hasker and 
Brueckner, however, rest upon misunderstandings of the argument.12 
The University of Notre Dame 
NOTES 
1. Ted A. Warfield, "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are 
Compatible," NOllS 31, 1997, pp. 80-86. 
2. William Hasker, "No Easy Way Out: A Response to Warfield," NOlls 32 
(1998), pp. 361-363; Anthony Brueckner, "On An Attempt to Demonstrate the 
Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," Faith and 
Philosophy 17 (2000), pp. 132-134. Page references to these articles will be insert-
ed parenthetically in the text. 
3. For Argument One see Hasker p. 363; for Argument Two see Hasker p. 
362. 
4. Hasker does not argue that any premise of either argument is false. I 
think that both arguments are sound but my purpose on this occasion (just like 
my purpose in writing my earlier article on this topic) is not to defend the 
soundness of these arguments. 
5. For Hasker's acknowledgment of this consistency see chapter four his 
God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). My argu-
ment is, plainly enough, directed at those philosophers who accept the falsity 
of logical fatalism (see note 3 of my original paper). But is there anyone who 
doesn't accept this? For further discussion of the relation between logical and 
theological fatalism see Alicia Finch and Ted A. Warfield, "Fatalism: Logical 
and Theological," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), pp. 233-238. 
6. I use numbered propositions as they appeared in my original paper. 
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Hasker, without comment, inserts an additional word ("freely") in brackets in 
attempting to reproduce my propositions (3) and (5). Though I do not know 
what the brackets are meant to express, I assume that Hasker's (3) therefore 
implies but is not implied by my (3). I also do not know why Hasker would 
substitute a nonequivalent proposition for my proposition in discussing my 
argument. Hasker, so far as I am aware, still accepts that what I have labeled 
(2) and (3) are consistent. 
7. There are, to be sure, delicate issues lurking in this neighborhood about 
how best to understand conditional proofs involving propositions that are 
necessarily true if true at all (like (1) and all claims about consistency and 
incompatibility). Hasker, however, does not raise such issues and so I will not 
discuss them on this occasion. 
8. Brueckner says that his presentation is a "simplification" of my argu-
ment. As with Hasker's attempted simplification of my argument, the prob-
lem with Brueckner's criticism is a consequence of the attempted simplifica-
tion. Perhaps the moral of the story is that if one wants to be sure to hit one's 
critical target, one should avoid attempts at simplifying what is already a short, 
simple argument! 
9. If there is a philosopher fitting this description, what is called for is a 
discussion with him of the merits of the logical fatalist position. 
10. Well, that's not quite right. There are a few other claims I disagree with 
and a few that puzzle me. I'll mention one of each. One claim that I disagree 
with is Brueckner's assertion that "it was not ... crucial to Warfield's reasoning 
that he consider the fatalistic argument... . He could equally well have consid-
ered any other bad argument [for the conclusion that] Plantinga does not freely 
climb" (p. 134). But perhaps this stunning assertion is just a consequence of the 
misunderstanding explored in the text. Finally, I'm puzzled by what 
Brueckner seems to think is a criticism of what I said about the relation of my 
argument to causal determinism. Brueckner points out that my claim that my 
argument would not help one attempting to argue for compatibilism about 
freedom and causal determinism depends on causal determinism being contin-
gent (p. 133). But this is exactly what I said in my original article (p. 85, note 
13). 
11. Additionally one might press, as Hasker fairly does, for a direct 
response to the positive arguments for theological incompatibilism. As indi-
cated in my earlier article, I prefer a broadly Ockhamistic response to the stan-
dard incompatibilist arguments. I hope to explore the issue fully on another 
occasion. 
12. I thank Tom Crisp for helpful discussion. 
